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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Ernesto Gutierrez-Medina timely appeals from the Judgment and Order.
Mr. Medina contends that he timely filed a post-conviction petition asserting that the
newly announced rule from Padilla v. Kentucky 1 applies to his unique situation.
Therefore, the order summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition should be
reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Medina, a citizen of Mexico, lawfully entered the United States as a worker in
1986. (R., p.S.)

The next year he married, which has resulted in four children, two of

whom are legal permanent residents of the United States and two of whom are United
States citizens.

(R., pp.4-S.)

In December 1990, Mr. Medina became a legal

permanent resident and received a green card that expired in 2001. (R., p.S.)
In 1995, Mr. Medina was arrested for delivery of a controlled substance.
(R., p.S.)

Although the charges were initially dismissed, the State refiled the same

charges in a different case, a year later. (R., p.S.) Mr. Medina's trial counsel informed
him that if he accepted the plea agreement, the conviction would not affect his
immigration status. (R., p.6.) Accepting his trial counsel's advice, Mr. Medina entered
an Alford plea taking advantage of the plea bargain that offered him probation.
(R., p.7.) In 1997, the district court imposed upon him a unified sentence of five years,
with two and one-half years fixed, suspended. (R., pp.3-4.) Mr. Medina pursued neither
an appeal nor a post-conviction action within the regularly designated time lines.
(R., pp.3-4.)

1

In July 1997, just a few months after his conviction, Mr. Medina's INS problems
began. (R., pp.3-4.) He was served a notice by INS that alleged he was subject to
removal from the United States due to his conviction in the delivery case. (R., p.7.) In
September 1997, the district court released him from supervised probation. (R., pA1.)
In November 1997, Mr. Medina was deported to Mexico.

(R., p.7.)

Not fully

understanding the immigration case, Mr. Medina used his green card to reenter the
United States. (R., pp.7-B.) In 2010, ICE arrested Mr. Medina for being in the United
States unlawfully. (R., p.B.) At the time of the district court proceedings, Mr. Medina
was awaiting removal from the United States. (R., p.9.)
On March 23, 2011, Mr. Medina filed his verified petition for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp.3-24.) Mr. Medina asserted in his post-conviction petition that, had he received
proper advice from his counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty.

(R., p.9.)

Mr. Medina contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under both the
federal and state constitution. (R., p.1 0.)
The State filed a Motion For Summary Disposition and Memorandum In support
Thereof seeking to have Mr. Medina's petition dismissed on procedural grounds.
(R., ppAO-43.) The State alleged that Mr. Medina's petition was untimely. (R., ppAO43.)
In response, Mr. Medina requested that the court equitably toll the statute of
limitations to protect his due process rights. (R., pp.70-80.) Moreover, he asserted that

Padilla announced a new rule and, therefore, should be retroactively applied because
this is his first opportunity to have his claim heard.

(R., pp.70-BO.) Mr. Medina also

asserted that, due to his circumstances, this was his first opportunity to bring the action

1

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

2

in state court. (R., pp.70-80.) Pursuant to a request for additional briefing, Mr. Medina
also explained that if Padilla announced a new rule, it was a watershed rule, subject to
retroactivity. (R., pp.99-117.)
The district court granted the State's motion and dismissed Mr. Medina's Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.142-144.) The court found that Padilla did announce
a new rule.

(Tr., p.12, L.9.)

However, the court the rule announced was not a

watershed rule of criminal procedure. (Tr., p.12, Ls.10-12.) The court determined that
there was no basis for equitable tolling. (Tr., p.12, L.23-p.13, LA.) Mr. Medina timely
appealed. (R., pp.163-166.)
Mr. Medina filed a motion for reconsideration.

(R., p.14S.)

The district court

denied the motion. (See Motion to Augment filed contemporaneously with this brief.)

3

ISSUE

Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Medina's post-conviction petition
because the Padilla court articulated a new watershed rule that under Idaho's unique
jurisprudence should be retroactively applied?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Medina's Post-Conviction Petition
Because The Padilla Court Articulated A New Watershed Rule That Under Idaho's
Unique Jurisprudence Should Be Retroactively Applied
Introduction

A.

Under Idaho's unique jurisprudence with regard to collateral challenges in postconviction, and particularly in light of Idaho's more expansive right to the competent
representation of counsel, Mr. Medina submits that the decision in Padilla constituted a
watershed rule and, therefore, the rule should be given retroactive application by this
Mr. Medina presented a material issue of fact that he received ineffective

Court.

assistance of counsel because his attorney incorrectly advised him on immigration
consequences rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. The
matter should be remanded for further proceedings applying the rule announced in
Padilla.

B.

Under Idaho's Modified Approach To The Teague Analysis, Idaho Courts Must
Always Determine Whether The Unique Jurisprudence Of Idaho Requires A
Different Result To The Retroactivity Analysis Than The United States Supreme
Court
Generally, new constitutional rules will not be applied retroactively to cases

already final on direct review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989). The United
States Supreme Court has identified two exceptions to the general rule.

See

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). In collateral proceedings, substantive

rules and watershed rules are applied retroactively. Shriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,
351 (2004).
The United States Supreme Court recently held that Padilla v. Kentucky,
requiring defense counsel to advise defendant about the risk of deportation arising from
5

a guilty plea, did not apply retroactively under its analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
28 (1989). Chaidez v. United States, _ U.S. _, _,133 S.Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013). The
Court held that Padilla declared a new rule and noted that Chaidez did not argue that
the two recognized Teague exceptions to the preclusion of retroactivity applied to his
case.

Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1107, n.3.

Chaidez made no argument that Padilla was a

watershed rule of criminal procedure. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted a modified form of the Teague analysis. See
Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 135-139 (2010). The Rhoades Court accepted the

invitation of the U.S. Supreme Court in Danforth v. Minnesota to define each of the
terms in the Teague analysis under state law.

In Danforth, the U.S. Supreme Court

addressed whether state courts could modify the retroactivity analysis it had previously
set forth in Teague in deciding whether to apply new case law to a collateral challenge
where the defendant's underlying conviction was already final. Danforth v. Minnesota,
552 U.S. 264, 267-269 (2008). The Danforth Opinion concluded that states were free to
do so. Id. at 275-282.
Upon remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Danforth elected not to abandon
the general standards of review under Teague in its entirety. Danforth v. State, 761
N.W.2d 493, 495-500 (Minn. 2009).

However, the Minnesota Supreme Court

recognized that a lock-step application of the federal standards regarding the Teague
analysis might not be advisable in its state court determinations on collateral review.
Therefore, the Danforth Court also held that Minnesota courts must independently
review cases to determine whether fundamental fairness requires retroactive application
of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Id. at 500.

6

Following the lead of the Danforth Opinion, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's
subsequent determination on remand to independently define the terms of the Teague
analysis under state law, the Rhoades Court held that it is mandatory for a reviewing
court in Idaho to "independently review requests for newly announced principles of law
under the Teague standard":
We now explicitly adopt the Teague standard in criminal cases on
collateral review. Furthermore, we follow the lead of the Minnesota
Supreme Court and hold that Idaho courts must independently review
requests for retroactive application of newly-announced principles of
law under the Teague standard.
Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 136 (emphasis added).

The Court in Rhoades explained why such independent review was necessary
with regard to state post-conviction claims.

First, the Court noted that, among the

criticisms to the Teague approach was that the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a
definition of a new rule that was overly broad, and therefore excluded most of the
decisions issued with regard to constitutional questions. Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 138.
Second, the Rhoades Court noted the common criticism in how narrowly the U.S.
Supreme Court had defined the two exceptions providing retroactive application for new
rules that were either "substantive rules" or "watershed rules." Id. Finally, and critically,
the Rhoades Court acknowledged that the primary motivator for the strictness of the
Teague standards under federal law was the concern against excessive interference on

the part of the federal courts in state law determinations. The Rhoades Court expressly
acknowledged that, in Idaho, "this Court does not have a similar concern for comity
when interpreting whether a decision pronounces a new rule of law for purposes of
applying Teague." Id. at 139.

7

Given this, the Idaho Supreme Court expressed throughout Rhoades that it was,
"committed to independently analyzing requests for retroactive application of newlyannounced principles of law with regard to the uniqueness of our state, our constitution,
and our long-standing jurisprudence." Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 140.

C.

Under Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence, And In Light Of The Salient Differences
Between Collateral Review Under The UPCPA And Federal Habeas, The Padilla
Opinion Announced A Watershed Rule Entitled To Retroactive Application Given
Idaho's More Expansive Right To Counsel
In the instant case, Mr. Medina contends that the new rule announced in Padilla

is a watershed rule and thus Teague and Chaidez does not prohibit retroactive
application.

Moreover, while the Chaidez Opinion controls the federal claim, as

explained above, Mr. Medina asserts that the Padilla retroactivity question must be
analyzed under Idaho's unique jurisprudence established by Rhoades v. State, 149
Idaho 130, 135-139 (2010).
In collateral proceedings, new rules that are either substantive rules or watershed
rules should be retroactively applied. Shriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). A
substantive rule is one that "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the
law punishes."

Id. at 353.

Procedural rules are those that regulate the manner of

determining the defendant's culpability.

Id.

The rule involved in this case is a

procedural watershed rule and, therefore, should be applied retroactively.
Watershed rules implicate the fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal
proceedings.

Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990).

The denial of the right to

counsel at trial has generally been cited as an example of a watershed type of rule
implicating the necessity of retroactivity. Id. Since Teague, the United States Supreme
Court has yet to hold that a new rule satisfies the requirements for watershed status.

8

Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418, 127 S. Ct. at 1182. However, prior to Teague, the United

States Supreme Court required retroactivity for a number of Gideon2 -type violations.
See Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 6 (1968) (retroactively applying White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) which held that a defendant has the right to counsel at

plea hearings); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3-4 (1968) (retroactively applying
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) holding a defendant has the right to counsel at

probation revocation hearings); McConnell, 393 U.S. at 3 (holding that the right to
counsel on appeal recognized in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) should be
applied retroactively).
1.

Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence Requires A Lesser Standard For Watershed
Rules With Regard To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel, As
These Claims Generally May Not Be Brought On Direct Appeal

Mr. Medina asserts that, because under Idaho's unique jurisprudence with regard
to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should apply a lesser standard
for what constitutes a watershed rule than is applied under federal habeas corpus
review pursuant to Teague. This is because such claims generally can only be brought
under Idaho law through a collateral attack under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act (UPCPA), rather than being brought on direct appeal and, therefore, the
concerns of comity and finality that motivate the federal standard for watershed rules do
not apply.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Rhoades noted that only two exceptions apply to
permit retroactive application of new rules of law under Teague - substantive rules of
law, which encompass only those rules that place private, individual conduct beyond
criminal proscription; and watershed rules of fundamental fairness. Rhoades, 149 Idaho

2

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

9

at 138-139.

But the Rhoades Court further noted that the federal courts have

interpreted the exception for watershed rules so narrowly that the "U.S. Supreme Court
has found no watershed rules in the 19 years since it adopted Teague." Id.
The narrow manner in which the Teague Court interprets both exceptions is the
direct result of concerns specific to the context of federal habeas corpus, and
concomitant concerns that the federal courts should not unnecessarily interfere with the
finality of state court decisions. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308-310. This is because federal
habeas corpus, "'is not intended as a substitute for appeal, nor as a device for reviewing
the merits of criminal trials,' but only 'to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems.'"

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 292 (1992) (quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring)). In fact,
the exhaustion of the claim in state court is a precondition of raising any claim in federal
habeas.

See, e.g., Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482, 486 (1975).

This requirement

presupposes that, in nearly all cases, the defendant in federal habeas proceedings will
have already obtained a ruling regarding all issues raised in habeas through the state
appellate courts from which his or her state criminal conviction arose. Id. at 486-490.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Danforlh recognized that the unique nature of federal
habeas corpus review may lead some states to apply a lesser standard of review for
retroactivity in light of their own state post-conviction procedures.

In fact, the Court

noted that it was the unique nature of federal habeas corpus review that prompted the
standards underpinning the Teague analysis. "A close reading of the Teague opinion
makes clear that the rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal
habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in
their own post-conviction proceedings than required by that opinion." Danforlh, 552
10

u.s.

at 277.

In fact, because the Teague retroactivity analysis was so squarely the

product of the particular concerns of the federal court in not disturbing the finality of
state law convictions, the Danforth Court further noted that these same principles of
comity might actually provide a strong basis for state courts to provide much broader
application of precedent in their own state post-conviction actions. Id. at 279-280.
Idaho's

unique jurisprudence

regarding

collateral

challenges to

criminal

convictions under the UPCPA does not share in the salient features of collateral
challenges under federal habeas that have motivated the federal courts to apply such
rigid and incredibly narrow standards for a watershed rule for purposes of retroactivity.
This is particularly the case with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which
normally cannot be brought on direct review and must instead be brought through postconviction under Idaho's unique jurisprudence and statutory law.
In Idaho, a defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both.
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992). While the defendant may, in theory,

raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the practical reality is
that resolution of such claims almost always turns on facts outside the record on appeal
and, therefore, expansion of the record through post-conviction is usually required in
order to properly adjudicate such claims. See, e.g., State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551552 (2001); Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791 (1985); Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292,
296 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 66-67 (Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549-550 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374,375-

376 (Ct. App. 1993). Given this, appellate courts in Idaho routinely decline to entertain
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when they are raised on direct appeal.
11

Elison, 135 Idaho at 551-552; Santana, 135 Idaho at 66-67; Saxton, 133 Idaho at 549550; Mitchell, 124 Idaho at 376.

The requirement that a claim of ineffective assistance be raised through a
petition for post-conviction relief, rather than on direct appeal, is all but inescapable for
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel of the type addressed by Padilla, where the
alleged deficiency relates directly to the private consultation occurring between an
attorney and client regarding the decision whether to plead guilty.

See Mitchell, 124

Idaho at 376 (recognizing that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requiring
development outside the trial record typically include issues as to "the adequacy of
counsel's communications with the defendant."). Under Idaho's unique post-conviction
jurisprudence, such claims would necessarily need to be litigated through collateral
attacks in post-conviction, rather than on direct review, because they hinge on
evidentiary matters outside the record on direct appeal. Therefore, the standards for
justiciability of such claims under Idaho law is the exact opposite as those present in
federal habeas corpus - rather than requiring that such claims be raised in prior
proceedings in order to properly exhaust state remedies, these issues of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be raised in any proceeding other than a post-conviction
petition under Idaho law.
Under requirements of exhaustion of remedies, review of any constitutional issue
under federal habeas corpus presupposes that the defendant has already had a prior
opportunity to litigate the claim at issue. Because collateral attacks in post-conviction
are almost always a defendant's first and sole state mechanism to raise claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel of the type described in Padilla, Mr. Medina asserts

12

such claims sufficiently implicate the fundamental fairness of the proceedings so as to
be deemed a watershed rule.

2.

Idaho's Unique Jurisprudence With Regard To Our More Expansive State
Statutory Right To Counsel Requires A Lesser Standard For Watershed
Rules With Regard To Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a defendant is
only guaranteed the right to counsel at "critical stages" of the criminal proceedings.

See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). However, by statute, Idaho's unique
jurisprudence provides a right to counsel that is broader in scope than that provided
solely under the federal constitution and, therefore, reflects a heightened concern for
protection of the right to counsel under Idaho law than inheres under the federal
constitution.
In addition to having an independent right to counsel under Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho State Constitution, criminal defendants in Idaho have extensive rights to the
assistance of counsel by virtue of statute. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-852. By statute in Idaho,
a criminal defendant has the right to appointed counsel, "to the same extent as a person
having his own counsel is so entitled," and is further entitled to the assistance of
counsel in post-conviction proceedings under most circumstances. See I.C. §§ 19-852,
19-4904.

Idaho's general statutory right to the appointment of counsel grants an

indigent defendant the right to appointment of counsel for any proceeding in which
retained counsel would be entitled to appear. State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 281-282
(1992). Moreover, this right exists, regardless of whether the right of appointed counsel
to appear in a proceeding, "comes from constitution, statute, regulation or ordinance."

Id. at 282; see also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-843 (2009). In addition, Idaho
provides for a more expansive right to counsel by granting the right to counsel in order
13

to pursue a discretionary petition for review before the Idaho Supreme Court - a right
that was expressly rejected under the Sixth Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Compare Hernandez, 127 Idaho 685, 687-688 (1995) to Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,

610-616 (1974).
Especially noteworthy is the fact that, by Idaho's unique jurisprudence and under
our statutory laws, a defendant enjoys a statutory right to counsel in post-conviction
proceedings. See, e.g., Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792-793 (2004). This is
quite significant with regard to our state's heightened protection of the right to counsel,
as the right to counsel in post-conviction actions is expressly not recognized under the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
555-556 (1987).
In fact, the Court in Finley expressly recognized that the standards for the right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment are more restrictive than the very standard that is
in place by statute in Idaho. In Finley, the Court held that the federal constitution does
not require the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant merely because an
affluent defendant may retain one for the proceeding in question. Id. at 556.
'''The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that
may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his
conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present
his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process." Id.
Thus, the federal standard for the right to counsel is expressly more limited than
that afforded to defendants by statute in Idaho - while the Sixth Amendment contains
no guarantee that an indigent defendant has the same right to the representation of

14

counsel as the affluent one, Idaho recognizes just such a right by operation of I.C. § 19852. See also Young, 122 Idaho at 281-282.

Moreover, once a statutory right to counsel has been conferred under Idaho law,
this right carries with it all the guarantees of effective assistance of counsel as does the
federal right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. See Hernandez v. State,
127 Idaho at 687.

As was noted by the Court in Hernandez, the "statutory right to

counsel would be a hollow right if it did not guarantee the defendant the right to effective
assistance of counseL" Id. Therefore, this Court treats the statutory grant of the right to
counsel under Idaho law as inherently conferring the right to the effective assistance of
counsel. Id.
Because Idaho provides for much broader protection of the right to counsel than
that recognized under the federal constitution, Mr. Medina asserts that this Court should
account for this heightened protection when reviewing retroactive application of new
rules of law that involve the right to competent representation of counsel.

This is

particularly the case where the rule in question involves issues of critical importance to
the competent representation of criminal defendants, as is the case with Padilla.
The Court in Rhoades has indicated that the standard for watershed rules in
Idaho encompasses review for whether the rule implicates the fundamental fairness of
the proceedings, and that Idaho courts independently review whether a rule would meet
this standard in light of Idaho's jurisprudence and our state constitutional standards.
See Rhoades, 149 Idaho at 134. In light of Idaho's more expansive right to counsel,

both under our constitution and under our statutory laws, Mr. Medina asserts that the
standards articulated for competent representation of counsel under Padilla should be
deemed a watershed rule by this Court.
15

D.

The Statute Of Limitations To File A Post-Conviction Petition Should Be Tolled In
Mr. Medina's Case Because He Was Denied Due Process Of Law
Mr. Medina seeks equitable relief and requests that this Court hold that the

statute of limitations be tolled for him to file his petition for post-conviction relief.
Mr. Medina asserts that due to the change in the law and his trial attorney's actions, he
was denied due process of law under both the federal and state constitutions.
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4902, an application for post-conviction relief must be filed
within one year from the expiration of the time for appeal, or from the determination of
an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is
later. I.C. § 19-4902; Evensioskyv. State, 136 Idaho 189,191 (2001). However, under
some circumstances the statutory time limitation for filing a petition for post-conviction
relief may be tolled. Idaho has recognized equitable tolling relating to post-conviction
petitions in two circumstances: "(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-ofstate facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to Idaho
legal materials; (2) and where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication renders a
petitioner incompetent and prevents the petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to
his conviction." Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960 (Ct. App. 2003). The Court of
Appeals recently reaffirmed the existence of equitable tolling in cases which "raise
important due process issues." Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,386 (Ct. App. 2011).
Mr. Medina asserts that the constitutional rights implicated by Padilla "raise
important due process issues." Id. Due to a change in the law effectuated by Padilla,
Mr. Medina asserts that he was denied due process of law. Mr. Medina requests that
this Court find that his case raises important due process issues and grant him
equitable relief by tolling the statute of limitations and deem that his petition was timely
filed.
16

CONCLUSION
Mr. Medina respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 21 st day of May, 2013.

DIANE M. WALKER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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